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The Teaching Excellence Framework and the regulation of the higher education market 
Introduction 
The Higher Education sector (HE) has recent experienced regulatory reforms that are intended to 
increase competition and introduce a market based1 HE sector.  Government policy increasingly sees 
the relationship between Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and students as one of business and 
consumer.2  Tuition fees have increased and the cap on student numbers has been removed but 
questions continue to be raised about whether the market can effectively regulate HE to ensure the 
50% increase in funding since 2007/08 results in improved quality and value for money for students 
and tax payers.3   
There is a paradox in Government policy.  The stated intention is to deregulate on the supply side, 
moving towards what it describes as a “risk based approach”, removing barriers to entry.4  The 
hands-off approach, promoting competition so as to achieve efficiencies, is not however applied 
consistently on the demand side.  Instead, new forms of intervention, including legal regulation, 
have been introduced, not least in the form of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA) and Teaching 
Excellence Framework (TEF).5   
In this paper, recent HE sector policy initiatives, including the CRA and TEF, will be considered in the 
light of the Government’s stated aims of increasing competition and quality.6 Particular attention 
will be paid to the role of information in encouraging competition and quality.  Limitations to the 
initiatives will be suggested and consideration will be given as to whether they can be addressed by   
recent policy changes including TEF subject-level and teaching intensity pilots.7   
Forthcoming changes to the education and training of solicitors will also be considered.  The 
Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) will remove the pathways route to qualification and replace it 
with the centrally set Solicitors Qualification Examination.   The move from course standardisation 
may result in more diversity of courses and the role of law firms in determining which courses give 
the best employment prospects will increase.  This can be seen as enhancing the role of the market, 
but raises the question of whether law students have adequate information to make the right 
choice, not only for  themselves, but also to ensure an efficient market.       
The paper concludes that, while the policy changes may not have delivered an effective market, 
consumer regulation has encouraged HE providers to improve the integrity of information available 
to students on their chosen course. 
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Information 
The justification for intervention in the form of the CRA and TEF is to improve information available 
to students, as poor information could cause a market failure.8  Information in the HE context is seen 
as essential to ensure certain desired outcomes.9  In terms of competition, access to information, 
which allows the consumer to differentiate between providers based on their preferences, is 
expected to drive effective competition in the HE market.10 This should encourage HEIs to be 
responsive to student preferences, to “raise their game, offering consumers a greater choice of 
more innovative and better quality products and services”.11  Students, as informed consumers, are 
expected to make better informed choices which should enhance “student engagement, 
satisfaction, retention and success whilst at university and employability after university”.12 An 
explicit link is made between the need for greater competition within the market, the availability of 
information and good graduate outcomes. While graduates are viewed, at one level, as critical to the 
UK economy and economic growth,13 for the graduates themselves, a university education warrants 
a strong graduate premium and low graduate unemployment rates.14 With students having invested 
heavily in their higher education, the ability to make an informed choice as to what and where to 
study is critical to the desired outcomes of high quality and student-focused higher education.15  
Prior to the introduction of the CRA and TEF, information available to prospective students included 
third-party ‘choice tools’16 such as websites and league tables.  These private sources of information 
were supplemented by the government endorsed KIS data on the UniStats website, and information 
available on HEIs’ websites.  While the information provided through these channels has been 
regarded as increasingly ‘user-friendly’,17 issues have been identified concerning the quality of the 
information, and access to it.18 A Call for Information in 2014 by the OFT on HE in England, dealing 
with the usefulness and accessibility of existing information, identified gaps in  information about 
the learning experience and course outcomes. Accessibility of the information, and the way it was 
displayed gave cause for concern.19 The information required to provide a more ‘rounded’ picture of 
the learning environment included information on inputs such as contact hours, class size and 
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teaching approach as well as employment prospects.20  So far TEF has only partially addressed these 
concerns.  
The 2016 government White Paper which preceded the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 
identified that the conditions required to realise a freely competitive HE market do did not exist. 
Poor information provision is identified as a key factor with little market pressure on HEIs to present 
information to differentiate themselves, particularly on teaching quality.21 Students lack the 
information required to make an informed decision as to what and where to study22 which gives 
little incentive to HEI’s to improve teaching quality. The White Paper seeks to provide “incentives for 
all institutions to improve and focus on what matters to students, to society and the economy”.23 
Nobody would decry the availability of valid information to help students make the best informed 
personal choice but HE is considered to be a “post-experience good”, where the individual student 
may not be able to judge the personal benefit to them at the start of the course, and possibly not 
until some time after they have graduated.24  This limits the effectiveness of information available 
prior to selecting a course and provider for the individual student.  The post-experience nature of 
education also limits the role that ex-ante information can play in promoting competition and an 
efficient market.  As a post-experience good the quality is not known before the student has been 
through university and quality can be interpreted differently by different students.25   Although  
increasing, or mandating, the availability of information can be seen as a low-cost non-intrusive 
regulation by law makers, its consequences can be to deter the adoption of better regulation, and to 
put burdens on enterprises while actually impairing consumers decisions.  Consumers can be 
overwhelmed by a surfeit of information and make economically rational decision to ignore much of 
it.26   This places limits on how effectively the increase of information and reliance on student choice 
can meet the wider objectives such as the enhancement of quality of teaching.27  
 
Consumer Law 
Consumer regulation also focuses on information provision. The CMA considers that an effective 
system of consumer protection law can be an adequate source of market regulation to protect 
consumers provided they are “well informed about what they are purchasing, and not at risk of 
being significantly harmed by poor quality”. 28  Responses to the OFT CFi raised concerns that there 
were significant gaps in the information available to students as well as concerns about the 
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accessibility of terms and conditions, the ability of students to understand them, and the extent to 
which they are fair and proportionate.29 The CMA published advice to help HEIs comply with 
consumer protection law and understand their responsibilities towards undergraduate students.30 
The advice focuses on information provision, terms and conditions and complaint handling and 
processes.31  
With regard to information provision, the advice covers the information that must be provided to 
prospective students at three stages: research and application stage, offer stage and enrolment 
stage.32 For prospective students researching their choice of subject and institution, the focus of the 
consumer protection legislation is the imposition of a general duty not to make a misleading 
omission or, put more positively, for ‘material information’ to be provided in a way which is clear, 
intelligible, unambiguous and timely.33 ‘Material Information’ refers to the information which the 
average consumer needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision.34 In 
this regard, the CMA highlights the importance to students of having full information about their 
courses and fees upfront.35   
 
The intention of the CRA is to consolidate consumer law rights and obligations in one place. While 
the applicable information provisions discussed remain outside the scope of the Act, anything that is 
said or written pre-contract to the student in the provision of that information, e.g. in the 
prospectus, is treated as a term of the contract if taken into account by the student in deciding to 
enter into the contract.36 The CRA further consolidates the existing unfair terms legislation37 and all 
contracts, rules and regulations that students are bound by are subject to the test of fairness under 
the Act.38 The contract between the HEI and student is one for the provision of educational services 
under the Act and as such it provides that the service will be performed with reasonable care and 
skill.39The CRA provides additional remedies, alongside the usual common law remedies,40 for breach 
of that duty and in the provision of inaccurate information with the introduction of a right to require 
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repeat performance or a price reduction .41 The practicalities of having recourse to such remedies for 
poor teaching provision, and specifically repeat performance in the HE context, has however been 
questioned, as it can result in a loss of funding, career opportunities and resulting living costs.42   
Students rarely transfer provider and will not recover fees unless they can demonstrate they were 
misled.43  The value and deterrent effect on the HEIs of these remedies may well be limited.  The lack 
of empowered consumers who can switch providers without financial penalty does not promote an 
effective market.44     
 
Following publication of the advice, the CMA commenced a compliance review to establish whether 
the advice had been successful in raising awareness among HEIs of their consumer law obligations 
and whether compliance had had improved. It further sought to identify whether evidence of non-
compliance remained.45 While the review confirmed that awareness among HE providers had 
increased significantly with examples of positive change in practice, there were also examples of 
non-compliance, including with regard to the accessibility and adequacy of information provided to 
prospective students, for example in relation to additional course costs and undergraduate degree 
course variation.46 As such, consumer protection legislation to date has raised awareness of the 
need to provide accurate information but it is less clear whether it acts as an adequate source of 
market regulation to protect the interests of students as consumers and as an effective incentive to 
improve the quality of HE teaching provision. While the CRA introduces new remedies, the value of 
these to consumers and deterrent effect from breach by HEI’s may be limited. Compliance with 
consumer protection provisions and specifically those set out in the CMA guidance continues to be a 
focus of regulation under the oversight of the Office for Students (OfS) which, as a consumer 
focused, sole market regulator, is also charged with administering the TEF.47 
 
Teaching Excellence Framework 
The on-going work to improve HEIs compliance with consumer protection legislation, the 
proliferation of available information in the form of KIS and league tables, and post-experience 
nature of higher education which limits the impact information has on effective competition, has not 
diminished the Government’s inclination to intervene.  Improving information to HE applicants is 
seen as essential for effective competition and the maintenance of quality.48  The CMA found that 
the HE sector in England is to a large extent characterised by healthy competition between providers 
who have a strong reputational incentive to provide high quality education and to actively compete 
for students, but still concluded that students find it difficult to assess the quality of courses before 
they start.  A wrong choice can result in a poor learning experience and long term detriment which 
justifies the need for further regulation.49  The White Paper maintained that good quality teaching 
results in good graduate outcomes and as such quality should be among the ‘key drivers’ of a 
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prospective student’s choice and their investment in HE.50 The information available to students 
however “can be hard to find, inconsistent and inadequate, making it hard to form a coherent 
picture of where excellence can be found within and between different higher education 
providers”.51 Further, the White Paper advances the view that the type of information available (and 
required under consumer protection legislation) fails to match students’ needs and priorities.52  
The TEF seeks to address these shortcomings with existing information provision by introducing 
“sector-wide rigour to the assessment of teaching excellence.”53  The Government’s position is that 
TEF provides “clear, understandable information” to students, supported by a rating system about 
where teaching quality is outstanding with the aim of making it clear to students where the best 
provision can be found. It should inform competition within the HE market and drive up the 
standards of quality as a result.54   
The purpose behind the TEF is laudable and all-encompassing: to better inform students about what 
and where to study, to raise esteem for teaching, to recognise and reward excellent teaching and 
better meet the needs of employers, business, industry and the professions in identifying the best 
graduates.55  Interestingly the priorities, in assessing quality and in choosing what and where to 
study, were identified as contact hours, class size and lecturer training, for which a lack of 
information is said to exist.56  These input metrics did not appear in TEF2 but do appear in some 
guise in the subject level pilot study.  TEF takes quantitative data from the National Student Survey 
NSS,57 HESA and ILR58 and the Destination of Leavers Survey from Higher Education (DLHE).59  These 
metrics have been criticised as unreliable ‘proxy’ measures of quality in learning and teaching in 
HE.60  In addition a 15-page written statement by the providers61  defined the metrics with which to 
judge teaching excellence across three criteria: teaching quality, learning environment and student 
outcomes and learning gain.62   
Intervening to regulate price but losing other policy levers   
The Government wanted to link increases in student fees to the TEF which would create some price 
differentiation in tuition fees and put some brake on the fees charged by providers rated Bronze.  
The Government however concede the immediate direct link between TEF and student loans in the 
face of opposition from the NUS and the House of Lords and the need to pass the legislation before 
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 Department of Education ‘Teaching Excellence Framework: Year Two Specification’ (DFE 232, 2016), ‘TEF 
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57
 Will be used to measure teaching quality with reference to the teaching on my course (NSS Q1-4), 
assessment and feedback (NSS Q5-9) and the learning environment with reference to academic support (NSS 
Q10-12).  
58
 Will be used to measure the learning environment with reference to non-continuation. 
59
 Will be used to measure student outcomes and learning gain with reference to employment or further 
student and highly skilled employment or further study, 6 months after graduation.  
60
   Mike Neary ‘saul Teaching Excellence Framework: a critical response and an alternative future’ (2016) 12 
(3) Journal of Contemporary European Research 690-695, 691. 
61
 In 22% of judgements the panel used their discretion to revise the metrics outcome following consideration 
of the written statements.  For HE or alternative providers the move was mainly from bronze to silver although 
three were downgraded, silver to bronze.  More Further Education colleges were downgraded. 
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Parliament dissolved for the 2017 General Election.  It was said that the link between TEF and 
increase in student fees was worth £1 billion63 which was seen as an incentive to HEI to focus on 
education, but this figure should be viewed in the context of the £28 billion University income, the 
majority of which comes from education.64  If education income has not driven market forces to 
improve the quality of education provision before TEF, it is by no means certain that it will do so 
subsequently.  The conversion of existing information to a simplified eye-catching label is more likely 
to feed into the reputational differentiation of universities.  The results of TEF2 have not disturbed 
the Oxbridge and Russell Group reputational position.65  TEF could end up again being about 
reputation rather than detailed data.   
TEF may fail to generate a direct financial incentive to improve education.  The introduction of 
student loans, to reduce the budget deficit,66 has lost the Government an important policy lever.  
The relative income per student for providing different courses has changed.  The higher cost ‘Group 
A’ courses such as medicine saw income increase by only 6% between 2011 and 2017.  For ‘Group D’ 
low-cost humanities courses, funding increased by 47%.  This could influence Universities’ incentives 
to move from the more expensive STEM subjects to ‘chalk and talk’ subjects such as Law.  The 
Government’s ability to influence and encourage more students to enter STEM subjects is reduced.  
This may however be addressed by the Education Review announced in February 2018 which is 
tasked with looking (again) at how students and graduates contribute to the cost of their studies as 
well as the graduates’ earnings potential and their benefit to the economy and the Government’s 
Industrial Strategy.’67                
All outputs, no inputs 
TEF uses existing data as proxies for teaching quality.  The extent to which these give a valid picture 
of quality has been subject to criticism elsewhere.68  The concern addressed here is that, while other 
pre-existing data sets did not ignore inputs such as staff student ratios (SSR)69 to date TEF is based 
entirely on outputs.  The TEF benchmarking process70 does not take account of the impact of factors 
such as tariff entry points and cross-subsidising of courses and other input data.  This is surprising 
considering the Government acknowledges that what “best predicts educational gain is measures of 
educational process: what institutions do with their resources to make the most of whatever 
students they have.”71  The various Government reports discussed in this paper acknowledge the 
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65
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‘Teaching Excellence Framework: Subject level pilot specification’ (DFE 182, July 2017), 44  
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role of inputs such as contact hours but Gold-rated institutions tend to have the largest class sizes 
and there is no evidence their students’ rate teaching staff any higher.72   
The pilot on teaching intensity, as part of the subject level pilot, is a start to redress the balance.73   
Contact hours and large class sizes are considered to have an impact students’ perception, 
engagement and depth of learning.74  The teaching intensity pilot looks at class sizes and SSR per 
class by two dimensions: hours and group size.  Data gathered at module level will be aggregated to 
subject-level but will not differentiate the form of teaching by lectures, seminars etc. or grade and 
experience of staff.  A weighting, based on five bands, will be awarded on number of hours taught by 
the SSR for each hour, to give an aggregated measure at subject level called the Gross Teaching 
Quotient.75   To aid validity two measurements of data are used: firstly from providers, not only on 
the contact hours weighted by SSR per class, but also on placement and field work activities; and 
secondly from students on their perception of whether the contact hours are sufficient for their 
studies.  The data is a supplementary to the subject-level metrics.  It will be considered as part of the 
holistic judgement in the second step alongside other narrative background information submitted 
by providers.  It is hoped the pilot will inform the extent to which the assessors can use the teaching 
intensity data to make judgements and how to expand collection of the data in the future.76  It may 
also contribute evidence on the relationship between teaching intensity and teaching excellence.77 
The pilot is a welcome start to redressing the balance by looking at the important contribution 
resource input data can make to teaching quality.   
Economic Data 
Following a review of TEF2 the Government halved the weighting of the NSS metrics.   While the 
metrics have been criticised the decision reduces the student voice on the quality of education.  At 
the same time in order to ‘strengthen the way that TEF holds providers to account for delivering 
excellent teaching’, supplementary metrics on Longitudinal Education Outcomes (LEO) data looking 
at employment and earnings outcomes up to 5 years after graduation, will add to existing graduate 
salary metrics from the DLHE survey.78  Rather than trying to assess the quality of the activity in the 
classroom, greater emphasis is being placed on economic factors such as graduate earnings and 
resources expended to improve SSR and teaching intensity.  TEF is moving towards a rating based on 
economic data supplemented by the provider’s narrative.  LEO and teaching intensity measure 
concrete data but their value may be lost when combined with other proxies to give the simplistic 
TEF rating.  If the objective is to improve information available to the student then the wider 
publicity and availability of LEO will allow students to consider the information themselves, and its 
use in league tables and other compilations can supplement the TEF rating.   
Increase in resources should be matched by increase in disclosure and governance  
University income from fees has increased by 25% since the 2012 funding reforms.79   The increased 
income and move to a market based approach to HE has not been accompanied by any significant 
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review of governance of HE providers, nor any increase in financial disclosure requirements.  While 
TEF has increased the focus on projected student earnings, an economic output, there is no 
consideration of differing financial inputs.  When income for HE was state provided and more 
modest, oversight by Government bodies such as HEFCE might have been adequate.  Risk for quality 
provision has however remained almost entirely with students and taxpayers rather than being 
transferred to the institutions.  In an era of increasing income from fees, governance of HE providers 
and the information on how they spend their students and tax payers’ money appears to be 
inadequate.   
Only 20 % of students consider they are given enough information on how their fees are spent.80  
While a few HE providers do volunteer information on financial spending in a user friendly form, the 
practice is not as ubiquitous as it is for local authorities or even privatised utilities.  It should become 
obligatory for HE providers to disclose how their spending is split between research, education, 
estates, administration and how much is spent per student on particular courses of study.  The move 
to subject level TEF is an opportunity for HE providers to disclose spending per student by course.  
Students studying the low-cost ‘Group D’ courses could consider not only their earning potential but 
also whether their fees are cross subsidising other students.  Full transparency would also ensure 
that increased funding benefits the student and their education.81  Some of the financial data might 
be complex but it could be re-packaged by third party intermediaries, including the private league 
tables, to be user friendly for potential students.    Disclosure and transparency would also allow for 
better independent scrutiny of individual HE providers financial and management performance.   
Legal Education 
Legal education will soon experience changes to the manner of regulation by the SRA.  In March 
2018 the Legal Standards Board approved the new framework proposed by the SRA for the centrally 
set Solicitors Qualifying Examination (SQE).82  In August 2018 the SRA selected Kaplan as the 
assessment organisation to develop and run the SQE83 and will return to the Legal Standards Board 
in 2019 for approval of the detailed rules to bring the SQE into force in 2020 or shortly thereafter.  
The removal of elements of course standardisation, such as the Qualifying Law Degree (QLD), means 
there will no longer be any oversight of course content or resources.  Providers will be able to 
determine their own academic approach to undergraduate and professional training provision.  The 
unifying factor will be the centrally set SQE and market forces.  The market for solicitors will be 
determined by law firms who decide who they want to train and employ.  Students embarking on 
courses need this information to make decisions about what and where to study.  The SRA plans to 
publish data on providers’ success rate for the SQE, but as students may study at more than one 
institution before taking the SQE, the authenticity of the data is not yet known.  It will not give any 
information on the market.  The market may diverge as larger law firms take more control of the 
provision of legal education while smaller firms themselves face uncertainty as to what courses 
produce the best trainees.  The removal of course standardisation, such as the QLD, may eventually 
                                                          
80
 HEA Survey (n 72), 17 
81
 While 52% of students considered spending on campus development was a reasonable use of tuition fees, 
spending less on buildings and sports/social facilities was seen as the most preferred way to save money.  HEA 
survey (n72), 17 and 2017 HEA Survey, 48. and the small % of fees spent on education at some US private 
institutions 
82
 Legal Services Board ‘LSB approves framework for SRA’s new admission requirements for solicitors (27 
March 2018)  
<https://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/LSB_news/PDF/2018/20180327LSB_Approves_SR
A_SQE_Application.html> accessed 26 August 2018. 
83
 SRA ‘Kaplan appointed as SQE assessment organisation (1 August 2018) https://kaplan.co.uk/insights/article-
detail/insights/2018/08/01/kaplan-appointed-as-sqe-assessment-organisation accessed 26 August 2018. 
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give more choice but opens up a long period of great uncertainty for law students.   This is very 
much at odds with Government policy where informed choice is meant to drive quality of provision.   
It could leave law students enrolling on courses that, unknown to them, cross subsidise students on 
other courses, and uncertainty as to whether their eventual qualification will be attractive to law 
firms. 
Conclusion 
Recent policy changes have resulted in an increase in funding but have not delivered an effective 
market.  TEF was intended to focus HEIs on teaching quality but it appears to be too early for this to 
have made a significant impact on student decision making.84  The existence of a HE market is called 
into question and the policy of relying on information to regulate quality has significant limitations.  
Changes to consumer regulation have however delivered an ethos in which HEIs take greater care in 
the information provided to applicants and students.  While the increase in information may not 
have delivered market forces to improve quality individual students are better informed about the 
course they choose.  
 
 
                                                          
84
 Reference to survey of students who are aware of TEF rating 
